Abstract-We present a new approach for K-anonymity protection in Location-Based Services (LBSs). Specifically, we depersonalize location information by ensuring that each location reported for LBSs is a cloaking area that contains K different footprints-historical locations of different mobile nodes. Therefore, the exact identity and location of the service requestor remain anonymous from LBS service providers. Existing techniques, on the other hand, compute the cloaking area using current locations of K neighboring hosts of the service requestor. Because of this difference, our approach significantly reduces the cloaking area, which in turn decreases query processing and communication overhead for returning query results to the requesting host. In addition, existing techniques also require frequent location updates from all nodes, regardless of whether or not these nodes are requesting LBSs. Most importantly, our approach is the first practical solution that provides K-anonymity trajectory protection needed to ensure anonymity when a mobile host requests LBSs continuously as it moves. Our solution depersonalizes a user's trajectory (a time-series of the user's locations) based on the historical trajectories of other users. We evaluate our techniques under various conditions using location data synthetically generated based on real road maps. The results show that our techniques can provide K-anonymity trajectory protection using a minimized cloaking area.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major concern of the large-scale deployment of locationbased services (LBSs) is the safeguards of the client location data collected by service providers. To use an LBS, a user needs to submit her location information. A person's whereabouts, however, may imply sensitive private information. For example, physical destinations such as medical clinics may indicate a person's health problems. Likewise, regular stops at certain types of places may be linked directly to one's lifestyles or political associations. Although the service users may be informed of the policies regarding the collection and distribution of their location data, the execution of these policies is typically beyond the users' control and relies solely on the service providers.
To prevent potential abuses of location data, a viable solution is to allow users to preserve their anonymity in requesting LBSs. For this purpose, however, simply using a pseudonym is not sufficient because a user's location itself may reveal her real-world identity. For example, if a reported location belongs to a private property, it is likely that the user is the owner of the property. Once a subject is identified, all her visits to other locations may be disclosed. This problem has motivated a series of research efforts on location depersonalization (e.g., by Gruteser and Grunwald [8] , Gedik and Liu [7] , Mokbel et al [18] , Xu and Cai [24] ). The proposed techniques employ a central anonymity server as a trusted proxy between mobile nodes and the providers of LBSs and let the server track the movement of mobile nodes. When a node requests an LBS, the server computes a cloaking box that contains the client node and K − 1 other nodes, and then uses this box as the client's location to request the LBS. Converting an accurate position into a cloaking box prevents a reported location from being linked to a subject with a certain degree of anonymity protection -a cloaking box with K nodes inside provides K-anonymity protection to the service user.
Reducing location resolution has been shown effective in depersonalizing location information. However, existing techniques compute a node's cloaking box based on the position of its current neighbors. Therefore, these techniques share several limitations. First of all, all mobile nodes, regardless of whether or not they request LBSs, must report their location frequently to the anonymity server in order for it to track their latest positions. In reality, nodes not needing LBSs may not be willing to spend their resources to help others maintain their anonymity. Excessive location updates from a large number of mobile nodes also present overwhelming communication and processing bottlenecks on the server side. In addition to the practicality and scalability issues, another problem is that the sizes of cloaking boxes produced by the existing approaches are highly dependent on the network density. When a node is in an unpopulated area, its cloaking box can be very large since it needs to contain the node itself and at least K−1 other nodes to provide K-anonymity protection. A fine cloaking resolution is critical for the quality of an LBS. An LBS server can retrieve and send back all query results pertaining to a cloaking box, but this would incur additional computation and communication costs.
The above limitations are not the most serious problem that arises from using neighbors' positions for cloaking. The most serious problem, in our opinion, is that this strategy is feasible
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only for depersonalizing an individual location instance, but not a time-series sequence of them. Indeed, existing techniques are practically impossible to support anonymity for continuous LBSs such as GM's OnStar services [1] . Continuous LBSs require frequent location updates from their clients. Simply ensuring each reported location is a cloaking box containing at least K nodes does not give a user K-anonymity protection. This is due to the fact that a time-series sequence of cloaking boxes forms a trajectory that may reveal the real identity of the user if, for instance, it links to the user's home and office. It may first appear that one can confuse a trajectory by associating each cloaking box with a different pseudonym. Unfortunately, using different pseudonyms, or simply not using identifiers at all, may not be effective. Since successive location samples are highly correlative, they could be re-linked based on a common trajectory using trajectory tracking methods (e.g., Multi-Target Tracking [19] ) without the need to know any identifiers.
To preserve a node's anonymity from its trajectory, one solution is to choose K nodes in the first cloaking box, and then ensure these K nodes are included in all future cloaking boxes generated for the user. Since the trajectory covers the moving paths of K different nodes, this approach supports trajectory K-anonymity. It, however, does not work in many cases. Since the K nodes may move in different directions, future cloaking boxes will become increasingly large, and eventually unacceptable for any meaningful LBSs. Ultimately, it is untenable to preserve a node's future anonymity based on its current neighbors.
In this paper, we investigate location depersonalization from a new perspective, aiming at addressing the above limitations. Public areas like parks and highways are naturally depersonalized spatial regions -they are not private property like house and office which can reveal a subject's identity; and such areas are characterized by a large number of visits by different people at different times. In light of this observation, we propose using users' footprints, instead of their current positions, for cloaking. A footprint is defined to be a user's location sample collected at some time point. The more footprints a spatial region has from different people, the less likely it can be correlated to identify a subject successfully. Thus, we can cloak a node's position based on its nearby footprints left by other people. Cloaking with footprints make it possible to prevent users not engaged in LBSs from having to report their location. This strategy can also significantly improve the cloaking resolution, since a spatial region can be exported as long as it has been visited by a certain number of different people. In particular, it provides a practical means to support trajectory K-anonymity: Given a user's expected route, the anonymity server can cloak it with K − 1 historical trajectories collected from other mobile nodes.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We propose to depersonalize location information using footprints, instead of the current positions of mobile nodes. We then apply this strategy for trajectory cloaking, i.e., depersonalizing time-series sequences of location samples, which until now no practical solution exists. We give a formal definition of K-anonymity trajectory (KAT) and present algorithms for computing such trajectories with cloaking resolution that is as fine as possible. The effectiveness of our techniques is studied under various conditions using location data synthetically generated based on real road maps.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of our system model. We define KAT and techniques for trajectory cloaking in Section 3. The proposed techniques are evaluated in Section 4. We discuss more related work in Section 5 and conclude this paper in Section 6.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW Similar to existing work (e.g., [8] , [7] , [18] , [24] ), our system lets mobile nodes receive LBSs through an anonymity server, which is considered as a part of trusted infrastructures. For LBSs that require user authentication (e.g., for service charges), we assume anonymous authentication such as those proposed in [10] [21] [20] is used. These schemes apply the concept of blind signature and allow a service provider to verify a user's legitimacy without having to request her true identity.
We also assume that the anonymity server is managed by some cellular service provider, through which mobile users have access to wireless communications. The cellular service provider offers anonymization services as a value-added feature to their clients, and supplies the anonymity server with the initial footprint database for cloaking. The location samples in the database may be collected from clients' regular phone calls. If such an initial database does not exist, we assume a location sampling phase, during which mobile nodes report their location periodically to the anonymity server. Unlike existing techniques, such periodic location update is no longer needed after the sampling phase, which may last only a short time period (e.g., a few days). More location data can be obtained from mobile nodes in their requests of LBSs and will be subsequently added to the database to improve cloaking resolution. Hereafter, we will use terms location sample and footprint interchangeably. Recall that a trajectory is a time-series sequence of footprints collected from a same user. Thus, the database can be considered as a trajectory repository.
Today's localization technologies allow cellular service providers to determine the position of a caller within a radius of 50 to 300 meters. In contrast, a GPS-enabled mobile device can detect its own position more precisely, up to 10 meter accurate. Due to this imperfect positioning, we use a spatial region, a circular region in particular, to represent each location sample. A rectangle can also be used to represent a location sample. However, rectangles of different shapes can have the same area, making it less desirable for cloaking.
For efficient retrieval of location data, we index the footprint database using a simple grid-based approach, as illustrated in Figure 1 . We partition the network domain recursively into cells in a quad-tree style. Unless a cell is already at its minimal size (our implementation sets each cell to be at least 200 × 200 meter 2 ), it is split if the number of users who have footprints inside it exceeds some threshold. For each cell, we maintain a cell table, which stores a list of pointers that link to the trajectories which have at least one footprint that overlaps with the cell. Specifically, each tuple of a cell table is a record of (uid, tlink), where uid is the ID of a mobile node which traverses this cell, and tlink is a pointer that links to the node's trajectory information. Thus, given a cell, we can efficiently retrieve the trajectories that pass through the cell. For an instant LBS with K-anonymity requirement, the server can simply compute a circular region that contains the requesting node's current position and at least K − 1 footprints, each from a different user. The server then uses this region to request the LBS on behalf of the node. To minimize the size the circular region, the technique proposed in [24] can be applied. In this paper, we focus on anonymous uses of continuous LBSs. To receive a continuous LBS, a user reports the anonymity server a base trajectory T 0 = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n }, where c i is a location sample on the trajectory along which the user will move. For better quality of services, the user may choose to have more location samples on the base trajectory. The user may also let the anonymity server generate the trajectory by giving a starting position and a final destination. Given an anonymity level K and a base trajectory T 0 , the server selects from the footprint database K − 1 other users' trajectories, each having at least n footprints, and uses them to cloak T 0 . The cloaking procedure will generate a K-anonymity trajectory (KAT) T = {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C n }. By covering T 0 and footprints from at least other K − 1 nodes, T can provide the user K-anonymity protection. A formal definition of KAT will be given later. After computing T , the server contacts the provider of the requested LBS to start a service session. As the node moves along the base trajectory T 0 , it reports to the server whenever it arrives at c i . In response, the server exports the corresponding C i to request the service on behalf of the user. Based on this location information, the provider delivers the requested services (e.g., query results) to the anonymity server, which then forwards to the service user. When the service session terminates, the location data reported by the service user is added to the footprint database for future cloaking.
III. TRAJECTORY CLOAKING
For continuous LBSs, a user needs to report a base trajectory T 0 = {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n }. In response, the anonymity server will compute a new trajectory T = {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C n } that can provide the user K-anonymity protection. For this purpose, T must cover T 0 . In addition, it must also cover footprints from at least K − 1 trajectories (from different users), which we will refer to as additive trajectories. Let these trajectories be
and m j denotes the number of footprints in T j . We give a formal definition of K-anonymity trajectory (KAT) as follows.
Definition 1: T is a KAT of T 0 , iff for each circle C i in T , the following conditions are satisfied:
2) C i covers at least one footprint in each additive trajectory; 3) For any C i and C i+1 , there exist two footprints a [j,x] and a [j,y] in each additive trajectory T j such that
, and x < y. The first two conditions ensure that each circle in T covers at least K location samples, each in a different trajectory. Given an additive trajectory T j , it is not necessary to have all of its footprints covered by T in order to provide Kanonymity protection to T 0 . Instead, we just need to make sure that T covers at least n footprints that are in the same order as they appear in T j . The third condition in the above KAT definition is to guarantee this requirement. Figure 2 illustrates an example of KAT, where K = 3. Given a trajectory T = {C 1 , ..., C n }, we define its resolution to be
, where Area(C i ) denotes the area of spatial region C i . For quality of services, a KAT's resolution needs to be as fine as possible. Given a database of N trajectories, there are C K−1 N different trajectory sets with cardinality K − 1. For each of these sets, its K − 1 trajectories can be used as the addictive trajectories to cloak base trajectory T 0 . Given a set of K − 1 additive trajectories, different orders of cloaking will also result in different KATs. Enumerating all possible combinations allows us to find the KAT with the best cloaking resolution, but this would require intensive computation. In the following subsections, we first discuss how to cloak T 0 with one trajectory, and then apply the proposed algorithm to cloak T 0 with a set of K − 1 trajectories. Finally, we discuss how to select a small set of trajectories for cloaking from a potentially large number of trajectory candidates.
A. Cloaking One Additive Trajectory
Consider cloaking T 0 with an additive trajectory T a . Let
where n ≤ m, and T = {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n } be the cloaking result. For each circle C i in T , it needs to contain c i and at least one footprint in T a . Thus, to minimize cloaking area, we can set C i to be the minimum bounding circle (MBC) that contains b i and some footprint in T a . When a footprint in T a is selected to create the MBC for C i , we call this footprint C i 's pivot. Because of the ordering constraint of KAT, not every footprint in T a can serve as C i 's pivot. To circumvent this problem, we can create a set of pivots by selecting n footprints from T a and using them as pivots based on their index number as follows. Let this set of n footprints be {a p1 , a p2 , ..., a pn }, where p 1 < p 2 < ... < p n ; then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a pi is used as C i 's pivot. The cloaking trajectory generated by this approach must be a KAT. The first two conditions are satisfied because C i is the MBC that bounds c i and its pivot, a footprint selected from T a . The third condition is also satisfied because the pivots included in T are in the same order as they appear in T a .
The challenge is how to select a set of pivots that can result in the best cloaking resolution. Given a set of pivots {a p1 , a p2 , ..., a pn }, we have T = {MBC(c 1 , a p1 ), MBC(c 2 , a p2 ), ..., MBC(c n , a pn )}, where MBC(c i , a pi ) denotes the minimum bounding circle that bounds c i and a pi . To find T with the best resolution, we can find all different sets of pivots, and for each set, compute the corresponding T 's resolution. Since there are totally C n−1 m−1 different sets of pivots, such exhaustive search may not be feasible in practice. To address this problem, we develop a simple yet effective approach to generate pivots for each C i , starting from i = 1. For C 1 , we select its pivot from the following m − n + 1 candidates: a 1 , a 2 , ..., and a m−n+1 . For each candidate, we compute the MBC that bounds this candidate and c 1 . The candidate that results in the smallest MBC is then selected as C 1 's pivot a p1 . Let a p1 be the footprint selected as C 1 's pivot, where 1 ≤ p 1 ≤ m − n + 1. Then, we select C 2 's pivot from the following m − n + 2 − p 1 candidates: a p1+1 , ..., and a m−n+2 . Again, for each of these candidates, we compute the MBC that bounds this candidate and c 2 , and then select the one with the smallest MBC as C 2 's pivot. Suppose a p2 is selected as C 2 's pivot, where p 1 +1 ≤ p 2 ≤ m−n+2. We then select C 3 's pivot from the following m−n+3−p 2 candidates: a p2+1 , ..., and a m−n+3 , based on their corresponding MBCs (with c 3 ). The same procedure is used to select the pivot for each of the rest of the circles in T . The complexity of this heuristic algorithm is O(m).
When determining a pivot, it is possible that multiple candidates result in the same smallest MBC. In this case, the one with the smallest index is chosen as the pivot. This would give more candidates choices when selecting the next pivot. It is worth mentioning that the above procedure selects each pivot from a certain range of footprints in T a . For C 1 , its pivot is selected from T a 's first m − n + 1 footprints. For all i > 1, C i 's pivot is selected the range from a pi−1+1 to a m−n+i . The pseudo code of the cloaking procedure Cloak(T 0 , T a ) is given in Algorithm 1. To illustrate this process, we use an example shown in Figure 3 . T 0 and T a have 4 and 9 location samples, respectively. For C 1 , its pivot can be selected from a 1 to a 6 . Since MBC(c 1 , a 2 
end if 9: end for 10:
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With Cloak(T 0 , T a ) in place, we now consider how to generate a KAT for T 0 , given a set of additive trajectories S. Let S = {T 1 , T 2 , ..., T s }, where s ≥ K − 1, and let
a fixed set of K − 1 additive trajectories, the order of cloaking can also affect the cloaking resolution of the cloaking results.
To avoid exhaustive search, we propose two heuristic approaches, Linear and Quadratic. The former incurs less computation costs, but the latter can lead to better cloaking results. Linear works as follows. For each trajectory T i in S, it calls Cloak(T 0 , T i ) to generate a cloaking trajectory, which we will denote as T i . If T i has a better resolution than T j , we say T i is closer to T 0 than T j . The trajectories in S are then sorted based on their distance to T 0 in ascending order, and the first K − 1 trajectories (which are closest to 
Algorithm 2 Linear(T 0 , S)
calculate |T i | 5: end for 6: S ← Sort S in ascending order based on distance to T 0 7:
T ← Cloak(T, T i ) 11: end for 12: return T In Linear, additive trajectories are selected based on their distance to T 0 . The distance also determines the order of cloaking. This simple strategy falls short in some cases because it does not consider the spatial relationships among the additive trajectories. This problem is addressed by Quadratic at a higher computation cost. This scheme also has K − 1 iterations, and in each iteration, it selects a new additive trajectory to cloak the trajectory, say T , which is generated in the previous iteration. However, the selection of the new additive trajectory is based on its distance to T , instead of T 0 . Initially, T is set to be T 0 . In each iteration, it calls Cloak(T, T j ) for each T j in S. Among all generated trajectories, the one with the best resolution is set to be T , and the corresponding T j is removed from S. After repeating this cloaking and selecting process K −1 times, T is output as T 0 's KAT. In the above approach, procedure Cloak(
2 ) times in the worst case. The pseudo code for Quadratic is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Quadratic(T 0 , S)
for all T j ∈ S do 5:
calculate |T j | 7: end for 8: compare |T j | for all T j ∈ S
9:
T ← the trajectory that is closest to T
10:
T ← Cloak(T, T )
11:
S ← S − T 12: end for 13: return T
C. Selecting Additive Trajectory Candidates
In both Linear and Quadratic, the entire set of trajectories S is scanned in the process of selecting K − 1 additive trajectories. Since the number of trajectories recorded in the footprint database can be very large, it is necessary to create a small set of additive trajectory candidates before starting a cloaking process. Obviously, only those trajectories close to the base trajectory should be considered as the candidates. In our implementation, we use the following approach to build a set of additive trajectory candidates given a base trajectory T 0 . We first find out all cells that overlap with T 0 's location samples. These cells are marked as searching boxes. According to their cell tables, we then retrieve the trajectories that traverse through all of these cells. If the total number of these trajectories is less than K − 1, we expand the search scope by merging each searching box and its adjacent cells together as a new searching box. For the new searching boxes, we retrieve the set of trajectories that pass through them. This process is repeated until the cardinality of the trajectory set is at least K −1, which are then chosen as the additive trajectory candidates to generate KAT.
IV. PERFORMANCE STUDY For performance study, we have implemented a prototype of the proposed system. We evaluate the performance of the two trajectory cloaking approaches, namely Linear and Quadratic. For comparison purpose, we have also implemented a native approach, referred to as Baseline hereafter, which uses the current position of mobile nodes for cloaking. This scheme sets a node N 's first cloaking circle to be the MBC that contains the node and at least K −1 others. Among the nodes in the circle, Baseline selects K − 1 nodes that are nearest to N as N 's companies. From then on, each time N makes a location update, Baseline finds the MBC that contains N and these K − 1 companies and reports this MBC as N 's cloaking circle.
We modify the Network-based Generator of Moving Objects [5] to generate mobile nodes and simulate their movement on the real road map of Oldenburg, Germany, a city about 15 × 15km 2 . We extract four types of roads from the road map, primary road (interstate expressway), secondary road (state road), connecting road and neighborhood road as defined in census TIGER/Line [2] . In our simulation, mobile nodes change their speeds at each intersection based on a normal distribution determined by the road type. The mean speeds and the standard deviations of moving speeds for each road type are listed in Table I . We generate a footprint database that contains a certain number of trajectories with randomly assigned user IDs. These trajectories are indexed using the grid-based approach discussed in the system overview section. For each simulation, we generate a set of LBS requests. Each request contains a user's ID, the start and destination of a travel plan, and a required anonymity degree. The start and destination are randomly selected from the neighborhood areas in the map, and the fastest path between them is picked as the user's expected route. We select a location sample every 100 meters along the route and these samples form the user's base trajectory. Other parameters used in our study are given in Table II. We are mainly interested in the potential impact of a cloaking technique on the quality of LBSs. For this purpose, we select cloaking range, defined to be the average radius of cloaking circles in a KAT, as our performance metric. In the following subsections, we report how the performance of the three techniques is affected by various factors. 
A. Effect of anonymity level required
In this study, we investigated the impact of anonymity requirement (i.e., the value of K, as requested by users) on the performance of the three techniques. The footprint database used in this study contains 200,000 trajectories. We generated 200 service requests, each having a route of 5000 meters with 500 meters deviation. The value of K is varied from 10 to 20. The performance results are plotted in Figure 4 . When K increases, the average cloaking range under all schemes increases, as shown in Figure 4 (a). However, Baseline always results in the largest cloaking ranges, about 10 times more, as compared to the other two. Given a service user, Baseline needs to ensure that all cloaking circles generated for the user include a common set of K nodes. Since these nodes may move on different directions, the cloaking range becomes increasingly large. When K is larger, the cloaking results also deteriorate quicker. As for the other two schemes, Figure 4 (a) shows that Quadratic always outperforms Linear. This, however, is achieved at a more computation overhead. Figure 4 (b) shows the average cloaking range on different types of roads. The primary and secondary roads are popular. A small space on such roads may have a large number of footprints from different users. Thus, the cloaking range is not very sensitive to the value of K. As the figure shows, the corresponding two curves are almost flat. In contrast, the connecting roads and neighborhood roads are less popular and have a much less number of trajectories passing through them. When K increases, the average cloaking range increases sharply, since a cloaking trajectory may have to cover different roads in order to guarantee a sufficient level of anonymity protection. In reality, a user's route typically covers different types of roads, and a large portion of the route is on highways. Since it is the cloaking circles along these popular areas that dominate the average cloaking range, cloaking with footprints allows users to select a large K for anonymity protection while maintaining good cloaking results.
B. Effect of base trajectory length
In this study, we investigated the impact of length of base trajectories on the performance of the three techniques. The footprint database used in this study contains 200,000 trajectories. In each simulation run, we set K = 15 and generated 200 base trajectories. The average length of these base trajectories is varied from 3000 meters to 8000 meters. The performance results are shown in Figure 5 . Under all three schemes, the average cloaking range increases as the Figure 5 (a) . However, Baseline performs much worse as compared to its counterparts. It is worth mentioning that the cloaking range under this scheme increases sharply as the base trajectory length increases. This again convinces that cloaking with neighbors' location is untenable for anonymity protection in continuous LBSs. As for Linear and Quadratic, both are little sensitive to the base trajectory length. As explained in the previous study, when a large portion of a user's trajectory is on highways, the cloaking circles on the highways determines the average cloaking ranges. Since our simulation uses the fastest path between a start and a destination as a user's route, when the user's base trajectory becomes longer, the increased portion is most likely on the the highways. Figure 5 
C. Effect of the number of historical trajectories
This study investigates the impact of the number of trajectories in the footprint database. We varied the number of trajectories in the database from 100,000 to 300,000. For each simulation, we generated 200 base trajectories, each averaged at 5000 meters with a deviation of 500 meters. We set K = 15 for each service request. The performance results are plotted in Figure 6 . It is shown in Figure 6 (a) that the curve for Baseline is flat. This is not a surprise since this scheme uses only the current position of mobile nodes for cloaking. As for Linear and Quadratic, both have better cloaking results when the database contains more trajectories. Clearly, more historical trajectories means more choices in selecting additive trajectory candidates for cloaking. With the same anonymity level, it can then find enough additive trajectories by searching in a smaller range for a base trajectory. Thus, the generated KATs have a smaller cloaking range. Since base trajectories can be added to the database for future cloaking, our proposed techniques can generated better and better cloaking results as more and more footprints are collected. This feature makes them especially attractive for large-scale anonymization services. Figure 6 (b) shows that the increase of the number of historical trajectories has a significant impact on the average cloaking range on unpopular roads, but not on popular roads. On the expressway or state roads, there is a sufficient number of footprints for cloaking, even when the database contains as few as 100,000 trajectories. In contrast, for the unpopular roads, adding some new trajectories could increase their popularity substantially. The problem of location anonymity was first studied by Gruteser and Grunwald [8] . As an extension of the traditional K-anonymity model [23] [22] [17] [15] [16] , they proposed to reduce the accuracy of a user's location information along spatial and/or temporal dimensions for a certain level of anonymity protection. Specifically, spatial cloaking is used to ensure that every location reported to a service provider is a cloaking area that contains at least K nodes. If the resolution of a location is too coarse for quality services, temporal cloaking is applied, i.e., delaying a user's service request. When more mobile nodes come near to the user, a smaller cloaking area can then be computed. This basic concept has inspired a series of research publications. In [7] , Gedik and Liu considered allowing users to specify their own value of K and minimizing the size of the cloaking areas, a factor critical for the quality of LBSs. The proposed CliqueCloak algorithm, however, incurs high computation overhead and is appropriate only when the value of K is small. In [24] , Xu and Cai presented an algorithm that can find the minimal cloaking area in a polynomial time, and considered the correlation attack of periodic location updates. The techniques proposed in [18] and [13] , by Mokbel et al and Kalnis et al, respectively, also support customization of K, but do not minimize the size of cloaking regions. An important contribution of these two works is their consideration of query processing, i.e., how a location-dependent query can be processed with a location of reduced resolution. While these techniques rely on a central anonymity server which functions as a middleware in between service users and service providers, the work in [6] by Chow et al assumes a decentralized mobile peer-topeer environment. To request a service, a user broadcasts a message to find K − 1 peers in its vicinity, and then uses the region that contains all these K nodes as its cloaking region. Despite their differences, all these techniques cloak a node's position based on its neighbors' location and guarantee Kanonymity protection under the assumption that each location report is an independent event.
In their pioneering work [3] , Beresford and Stajano investigated the challenges of hiding a user's moving trace and proposed an innovative concept called mix zone. A mix zone is defined to be a spatial region in which a mobile node does not report its location. When there are multiple nodes inside a same mix zone, they exchange their pseudonyms. After exiting the mix zone, these nodes start to use new pseudonyms in location updates, making it hard for an adversary to link incoming and outgoing paths of these nodes. While this approach relies on a set of predefined spatial regions for pseudonym exchanging, the path confusion algorithm proposed by Hoh and Gruteser in [11] allows mobile nodes to switch their pseudonyms when their paths are close to each other, say, within some threshold. These approaches are not designed to support anonymous uses of LBSs, since they report users' true position to service providers. Another technique designed for trace hiding was using false dummies investigated in [14] . In this scheme, each location submitted to a service provide is accompanied by K − 1 false dummies, which are generated to simulate the movement of mobile nodes. By making K − 1 faked traces, the trace of a service user is under K-anonymity protection. This approach, however, cannot support anonymous uses of LBSs either. The adversary can identify the dummy trace as
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a fake if a sample false dummy is located inside a nonresidential region (e.g. a lake), or the trace passes through multiple spatial regions that exclusively belongs to different users. Under these circumstances, the user's anonymity is compromised. The problem of trajectory anonymity is also investigated in [4] and [12] . Their basic idea is to ensure all cloaking boxes generated for a user include a common set of K − 1 other users covered by the first cloaking box. As mentioned early, this strategy will make future cloaking boxes larger and larger and eventually meaningless for LBSs.
In [9] , Gruteser and Liu considered the problem of hiding sensitive areas (e.g., a night club) visited by users from adversary. This work classifies areas as either sensitive or insensitive. When a node is in a sensitive area, its location update is suppressed. Otherwise, it reports its location, but reduces the location accuracy when moving close to some sensitive area. Specifically, when the node is in a region around sensitive areas, it reports an area that contains at least K sensitive areas as its current location. In this way, an adversary cannot find which sensitive area the user actually enters. This work protects a user's location privacy -an adversary may be allowed to know a subject's identity, but not the sensitive areas it visits. This is different from the aforementioned location anonymity which protects user identity by ensuring each cloaking area contains at least K users, rather than K sensitive areas.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Personal location data can be correlated with restricted spaces such as home and office addresses for subject reidentification. This is probably the most practical and economic way for an adversary to identify the anonymous users of LBSs, which can cover a global wide area with a large number of clients. To address this problem, we depersonalize users' location based on historical location data. For the users of sporadic LBSs, we ensure each location reported to their service providers has been visited by at least K different people. For the users of continuous LBSs, we ensure each trajectory reported has been traversed through by at least K different people. The idea makes it much less costly to support anonymous uses of LBSs as evidenced in our performance study.
Nevertheless, several interesting research problems arise from exploring historical location data for anonymity protection. For instance, to cloak a trajectory, we should also consider selecting the additive trajectories of mobile nodes with similar moving speeds during similar time spans to further prevent an adversary from concluding what historical trajectories may have been used. We also plan to investigate on-the-fly cloaking to provide anonymity protection when a user needs to take a significantly different route after submitting the initial trajectory for cloaking. Simply cloaking the new route may jeopardize the user's anonymity if the two trajectories contain footprints from different sets of users.
